THE PROMISE — AND THE PERILS — OF NIGERIA’S POST-1999 BY GBEMIGA BAMIDELE
BY GBEMIGA BAMIDELE
GREATRIBUNETVNEWS–WHEN Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 under the new constitution, hopes soared. Many
believed that formal democracy, elections, party politics, constitutional rule, would usher in
accountable governance, social development and empowered citizens. But more than two
decades into the Fourth Republic, the reality remains mixed: democratic forms endure, but the lived benefits for ordinary Nigerians fall short.
A tapestry of institutional weaknesses, elite
capture, “godfatherism” and agenda-less party politics has compromised much of the promise.
Recent scholarship paints the picture starkly: political parties, rather than being vehicles for
popular representation and development, have often served as conduits for elite rent-seeking,
impeding good governance, true internal democracy, and inclusive socio-economic progress.
One of the most persistent and damaging patterns in Nigerian party politics has been the rise
and entrenchment of what scholars call “political godfatherism.”
In theory, political parties should offer open contestation, transparent primaries, and
candidate selection based on merit or popular support. But in practice, many potential
candidates are “imposed” by wealthy sponsors. A 2024 empirical study of state-level
politics found that so-called “godfathers” finance and control who becomes candidate,
turning democratic choice into elite bargaining.
The result: “internal party democracy” the idea that party members choose their own
leaders, has largely collapsed. Instead, candidate-selection is dominated by a small
circle of elites, undermining accountability.
The dominance of godfathers has triggered a series of negative effects: party defections
(“cross-carpeting”), litigation over primaries, factionalism, and instability.
In short: while the ballot box returns did reflect citizens’ votes, the process of who stands for
election is often compromised at the root. That legacy continues to damage the legitimacy of
parties and their leaders and undermines the ideal of politics by the people for the people. If
party politics are riddled with elite manipulation, governance itself has suffered. Since 1999,
successive governments under the major parties have struggled to translate oil wealth and
public revenues into broad social progress.
Many scholars argue that rather than “rubber-stamping” development, the state has often
acted as a “predatory” instrument for elite enrichment. Public budgets are routinely
inflated, constituency-project funds mismanaged, and basic services remain
underfunded or dysfunctional.
Anti-corruption institutions (established to check graft) have frequently been used
selectively sometimes to punish political opponents, at other times to shield allies. This
undermines public trust in rule-of-law and fairness.
A 2025 assessment of Nigeria’s democratic track record concludes that democratic
governance has produced “increasing exclusion, dysfunction and precarious,” rather
than the social contract many hoped for in 1999.
Thus, while Nigeria has had uninterrupted democratic rule since 1999 a major achievement
governance has under-delivered for the majority of citizens. The structural link between political
power and private wealth has remained largely intact. Democratic institutions alone do not
guarantee a democratic culture. In many parts of Nigeria, politics remains intensely personal,
transactional, and identity-based
Ethnicity, regional alignments, and patron-client networks continue to shape voter
behavior often more than policy platforms. The absence of clear ideological differences
between major parties means that many votes are cast along religious, regional or
personal loyalty lines rather than on programmatic grounds.
Over time, repeated episodes of electoral manipulation, elite monopolization, and
betrayal of public trust have eroded civic enthusiasm. According to a 2025 academic
evaluation, many citizens have “rationally withdrawn” from active political participation
not out of apathy, but because they see the system as incapable of delivering real
change.
The net effect is a circulation of political elites and a disconnection between political
parties and the grassroots. Parties exist, but the state of “political culture” remains
shallow: weak civic engagement, low internal accountability, and entrenched elite
dominance.
The way political parties lead both internally and in government has also shaped Nigeria’s
outcomes.
Leadership has tended to be centralized: party bosses and strongmen often determine
candidates, policy directions, and patronage reducing transparency and discouraging
collective decision making.
Because parties are more vehicles for power than for vision, their leadership style often
privileges short-term gains (e.g., patronage, contracts, political appointments) over
long-term institutional reform and public service delivery.
When reforms are attempted such as budget reforms, subsidy removals, or
macroeconomic adjustments they are often politically driven, reactive, or inconsistent.
This creates uncertainty and undermines confidence in sustained progress.
In effect, leadership has remained largely transactional, concentrated, and elite-driven rather
than collective, ideological, or reform-oriented.
At the national economic level, there have been moments of success. But for most Nigerians,
the benefits remain elusive.
Analyses of the Fourth Republic (1999–2015) conclude that the state has “failed largely
to commence the process of social and economic transformation.” Despite oil revenues
and state budgets, investment in human development, infrastructure, poverty reduction
and inclusive growth was inadequate.
A major problem is inequality: research shows that income inequality and political
inequality reinforce each other. Political power remains in the hands of economic elites,
while the majority often economically marginalized, remain excluded both from
decision-making and from access to social goods.
Efforts at poverty alleviation and social welfare (such as the National Poverty Eradication
Programme, NAPEP) produced limited results. Corruption, mismanagement and lack
of follow-through meant that many intended beneficiaries especially the poorest saw
little benefit.
In sum: GDP growth, budget size, and formal democratic governance have increased but
human development, equitable opportunity, and social inclusion remain weak.
Why has it been so difficult for political parties in Nigeria to deliver on the promises of
democracy and development? Several structural factors appear consistently in the scholarly
literature:
The monetization of politics: Running for office requires huge money, which effectively
bars ordinary citizens from competing. That ensures winners are almost always
wealthy or sponsored by wealthy backers.
The dominance of “elite theory”: political power tends to be concentrated in a small class
that cycles through parties, offices, and public resources. As elites re-produce
themselves, the broader masses remain politically marginalized.
Weak institutional checks: although anti-corruption agencies exist, they are often
politicized; courts may be compromised; oversight is selective. That undermines the
rule of law.
Lack of ideological or programmatic differentiation among parties: Many parties are
vehicles for ambition, not for concrete visions of Nigeria’s future. Without clear
platforms, voters gravitate toward identity, patronage or immediate personal benefit not
long-term policy.
It would be unfair to say “nothing works.” The democratic structures elections, multiple parties,
constitutional rule, media space, civic activism have endured, even if imperfectly. The fact that
since 1999 there has been relative continuity, peaceful (mostly) transfers of power, and
occasional policy reforms shows that the framework of democracy is somewhat stable.
Moreover, recent scholarship suggests growing awareness among citizens: more debates about
inequality, political exclusion, and the need for reform.
The very persistence of these debates may create the social pressure needed for reform. If
citizens demand real inclusion, transparency, and accountability and hold parties to meaningful
standards there remains a chance for renewal.
If Nigeria’s democracy is to fulfill its promise, several reforms seem essential:
Demonetize politics. Lower the cost of running for office; enforce spending caps;
subsidize candidate registration for ordinary citizens. This helps open up politics to
non-elites.
Strengthen intra-party democracy. Require transparent primaries, open delegate
processes, and internal party rules that prevent imposition of candidates by godfathers.
This will help rebuild legitimacy from within.
Reinforce institutional accountability. Bolster the independence and capacity of
anti-corruption agencies, ensure impartial judiciary oversight, and require transparent
public-finance and budget-reporting.
Promote programmatic politics. Encourage parties to adopt clear manifestos and
ideological platforms; civil society and media can spotlight and compare these
platforms, so citizens vote on issues, not identity or patronage.
Focus on inclusive development. Public investments should prioritize human
development (education, health, welfare), infrastructure and poverty reduction not just
high-visibility projects or patronage.
The story of Nigerian parties from 1999 to today is one of contrasts. On paper, we have
democracy elections, parties, constitutions. But more often than not, this democracy has served
a narrow elite. Political parties end up as rent-seeking machines; leaders answer to sponsors or
backers, not to citizens; public resources are diverted; and many Nigerians remain excluded
from the benefits of growth.
Yet the potential remains. The structures institutions, laws, civic space exist, even if weakened.
With sustained pressure and meaningful reform, Nigeria could still reimagine its democracy as a
tool for broad social inclusion and development. For now, however, the Fourth Republic remains
democracy in form, but only partially in substance.
Gbemiga Bamidele, Ph.D, a Communication Scholar is the Convener,
Society for Journalism Enhancement Initiatives (S4JEI)
About the Author
